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NOTES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-SEPARATION AGREEMENTS:
EFFECT OF RESUMED MARITAL RELATIONS-Murphy v.
Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
Supreme Court Drops Adamee's Other Shoe
INTRODUCTION
Since 1890, the settled law of North Carolina has been that the
"resumption of marital relations" will void a separation agreement
to the extent that such an agreement remains executory.I However,
the definition of resumption of marital relations has remained un-
certain. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that a hus-
band and wife resuming cohabitation and holding themselves out as
living together as man and wife had resumed the marital relation-
ship even without their engaging in sexual intercourse.2 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals has held that resumption of sexual activ-
ity between estranged spouses does not void a separation agreement
without a finding that both parties intended to resume marital rela-
tions.3 In Murphy v. Murphy' the North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected the court of appeals' requirement of intent and held that
"sexual intercourse between a husband and wife after the execution
of a separation agreement avoids the contract."'5 This note will ex-
amine the rationale behind and implications of the Murphy deci-
sion.
THE CASE
In August of 1973, plaintiff-husband filed an action for absolute
divorce based on one year's separation. He alleged the facts required
by the statute and the execution of a separation agreement settling
the custody and support of the children born of the marriage., Pray-
ing for the denial of the divorce, defendant-wife admitted the mar-
riage and separation but alleged that the separation agreement was
void on the grounds, inter alia, that "after June of 1972 and continu-
1. Smith v. King, 107 N.C. 273, 12 S.E. 57 (1890).
2. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).
3. Cooke v. Cooke, 34 N.C. App. 124, 237 S.E.2d 323, cert. denied, 293 N.C.
740, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977); Newton v. Williams, 25 N.C. App. 527, 214 S.E.2d 285
(1975).
4. Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
5. Id. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
6. Id. at 390, 245 S.E.2d at 694.
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ing through April or May of 1973, plaintiff and defendant 'resumed
their marital relationship' by having intercourse with one another."7
The wife also counterclaimed for custody of the children, alimony
without divorce and child support.
The trial judge allowed the husband's motion to sever the wife's
counterclaim to set aside the separation agreement and to try that
issue to a jury prior to the husband's action for divorce.8
The wife testified that she and her husband had entered into a
separation agreement; but that during the time set forth in her
answer, they had engaged in sexual intercourse "certainly at least
two dozen [times], probably more."9 The husband admitted the
resumption of sexual activity but estimated that sexual intercourse
occurred on six or eight occasions. He further testified that "I did
not ever agree with her we would resume our marital relation. I
always told her there was no way. . . we could resume our relation-
ship." 0
The issue submitted to the jury was: "If [the separation agree-
ment was valid when executed], was the separation agreement and
property settlement. . . terminated by the acts and conduct of the
plaintiff and defendant?"" The trial judge then charged the jury:
Now in this connection I charge you that where a husband and
wife enter into a separation agreement and thereafter become rec-
onciled and renew the marital relations, the agreement is termi-
nated for every purpose insofar as it remains executory. And the
words 'become reconciled and renew their marital relations' means
not just a mere reconciliation or making up of the parties, but it
means renewal and resumption of the marital relations, and this
would require something more than sexual intercourse alone. It's
essential that there be a mutual intent to resume cohabitation.
The word cohabitation in our law means something more than
sexual intercourse between the parties. Cohabitation ordinarily
contemplates establishment of a home in which the parties live in
the married relationship, normal relationship of husband and
wife.12
The jury found that the separation agreement had not been
terminated and judgment was entered on the verdict.' 3 The defen-
dant appealed, assigning the charge as error.
7. Id. at 391, 245 S.E.2d at 694.
8. Murphy v. Murphy, 34 N.C. App. 677, 679, 239 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1977).
9. 295 N.C. at 393, 245 S.E.2d at 695.
10. Id. at 393, 245 S.E.2d at 696.
11. Id. at 391, 245 S.E.2d at 694-95.
12. Id. at 394-95, 245 S.E.2d at 696-97 (emphasis added by court).
13. Id. at 391, 245 S.E.2d 694-95. %
132 [Vol. 1:131
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BACKGROUND
In 1890 the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the rule of
law voiding separation agreements upon the resumption of marital
relations." Prior to that time, separation agreements were void as
against public policy. 5 However, where a husband had placed-prop-
erty in trust to secure an annuity in consideration of separation, the
court held that assuming the separation were otherwise valid, the
parties' resumption of living together as man and wife had voided
the contract.'6
While the supreme court continued to follow this rule, it did
not undertake to define "resumption of marital relations" before
1977. An examination of the way in which the court articulated the
rule, however, does shed some light on the problem. Cases from 1912
to 1955 stated the rule in terms of "resumption of conjugal rela-
tions"" or "resumption of conjugal cohabitation."' 8 Manifestly, the
court considered resumption of sexual activity important, if not
decisive. In 1955 the court began to use the phrase "resumption of
marital relations,"' 9 though a few cases did advert to other terms.20
While the entire line of cases establishes sexual intercourse as an
element of resumed marital relations, the facts of those cases, al-
most without exception, imply or state an attempted reconciliation
by mutual consent. The signal exception is State v. Gossett.2 1
In Gossett, the husband separated from his wife pursuant to a
separation agreement providing for the support of the wife. When
the husband failed to provide this support, he was charged with
non-support under the criminal statutes. The husband pleaded the
separation agreement as a defense. The wife testified that she and
14. Smith v. King, 107 N.C. 273, 12 S.E. 57 (1890).
15. Collins v. Collins, 62 N.C. 514 (1867).
16. 107 N.C. at 276, 12 S.E. at 57.
17. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 210 N.C. 554,187 S.E. 768 (1936); State v. Gossett,
203 N.C. 641, 166 S.E. 754 (1932); Moore v. Moore, 185 N.C. 332, 117 S.E. 12
(1923); Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 408, 74 S.E. 327 (1912) (citing Smith v. King
as using "conjugal relations" although the term "cohabitation" was used by the
Smith court.)
18. Turner v. Turner, 242 N.C. 533, 89 S.E.2d 245 (1955); Campbell v. Camp-
bell, 234 N.C. 188, 68 S.E.2d 672 (1951).
19. Whitt v. Whitt, 32 N.C. App. 125, 230 S.E.2d 793 (1976); Joyner v. Joyner,
264 N.C. 29, 140 S.E.2d 714 (1965); Williams j,. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 134 S.E.2d
277 (1964); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 260 N.C. 628, 133 S.E.2d 459 (1963); Jones v.
Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 90 S.E.2d 574 (1955).
20. Potts v. Potts, 24 N.C. App. 673, 211 S.E.2d 815 (1975) ("cohabitation");
Bass v. Mooresville Mills, 11 N.C. App. 631, 182 S.E.2d 246 (1971) ("conjugal
relations").
21. 203 N.C. 641, 166 S.E. 754 (1932).
1979]
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her husband engaged in sexual intercourse during the interval be-
tween the execution of the separation agreement and the issuance
of the warrant. The trial judge instructed the jury to regard the
agreement as void if they found the wife's testimony to be true. The
North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conviction on appeal.
Although no intent to reconcile existed, at least one author felt that
Gossett was limited to its facts since it arose in a criminal context."
In Newton v. Williams2 3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
defined "resumption of marital relations." The court held that, not-
withstanding the stipulations of the parties that for over two years
they had lived together one week out of each month and had en-
gaged in sex during those weeks, no resumption of marital relations
could have occurred without proof of the "essential element" of
mutual intent .2 Because the evidence concerning intent was in con-
flict, the court held that the granting of summary judgment was
error.2 As authority for its requirement of mutual intent, the court
quoted Lee's North Carolina Family Law:
Mere proof that isolated acts of sexual intercourse have taken
place between the parties is not conclusive evidence of a reconcilia-
tion and resumption of cohabitation. There must ordinarily appear
that the parties have established a home and that they are living
in it in the normal relationship of husband and wife. 21
Lee's treatise makes clear that he was stating the general rule in
other jurisdictions." Worthy of note is that other authorities on
which the Newton court relied cite Gossett as contra this rule.2 In
several subsequent cases, including Murphy, the court of appeals
adhered to its requirement of intent.2
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court had not addressed
the precise issue presented in Murphy until it considered that case,
it decided an analogous issue in In re Estate of Adamee.0 In Adamee
the husband and wife separated under an agreement in which the
wife waived her right to administer her husband's estate. The wife
later moved back into the husband's house where she remained
22. 1 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 35 at 153, n. 105 (3d ed. 1963).
23. 25 N.C. App. 527, 214 S.E.2d 285 (1975).
24. Id. at 532, 214 S.E.2d at 288.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 531, 214 S.E.2d at 287 (quoting 1 R. LEE, supra note 22, at 153).
27. 1 R. LEE, supra note 22.
28. See, e.g., 42 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 601 (1975).
29. E.g., Cooke v. Cooke, 34 N.C. App. 124, 237 S.E.2d 323, cert. denied, 293
N.C. 740, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977).
30. 291 N.C. 740, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977).
[Vol. 1:131
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until his death eight months later. When the wife filed for letters of
administration, the clerk of court found the agreement void because
of the resumption of marital relations and therefore held that the
wife was entitled to be administratrix. The husband's relatives ap-
pealed to superior court and moved for summary judgment on the
basis of their affidavits that the wife's return to Adamee's house had
been solely for economic convenience, that the husband and wife
had had no intention to resume marital relations and that they had
slept in separate bedrooms. The wife answered by affidavit that she
and her husband had made a full reconciliation. The superior court
denied summary judgment and ordered a jury trial on the issue of
reconciliation. The wife appealed and the court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court, by Chief Justice Sharp, reversed, stating that
"the heart of a separation agreement is the parties' intention and
agreement to live separate and apart forever, and. . . they void the
separation agreement if they re-establish a matrimonial home. ' 3 ,
The court held that "when separated spouses who have executed
a separation agreement resume living together in the home which
they occupied before the separation, they hold themselves out as
man and wife 'in the ordinary acceptation of the descriptive phrase.'
. . . [Iln contemplation of law, their action amounts to a resump-
tion of marital cohabitation which rescinded their separation agree-
ment. 3 2 After reviewing the evidence before the superior court, the
Adamee court found that "no issue arose for either judge or jury to
decide as to their resumption of marital relations. As a matter of law
they had done so."
This holding brought into sharp focus the disparate theories of
the supreme court and the court of appeals. On the one hand, the
court of appeals held fast to its requirement that admitted reconcili-
atory acts notwithstanding, mutual intent to resume marital rela-
tions was essential. On the other hand, the supreme court held in
Adamee that intent notwithstanding, the fact of resumed cohabita-
tion effected a resumption of marital relations as a matter of law.
The supreme court recognized this dichotomy by stating in Adamee:
In its consideration of this case the Court of Appeals began
with the assumption that the appeal involved a disputed fact, that
is, whether a reconciliation and resumption of marital relations
had actually occurred between Adamee and Mrs. Adamee. We,
31. Id. at 391, 230 S.E.2d at 545.
32. Id. at 392-93, 230 S.E.2d at 546.
33. Id. at 393, 230 S.E.2d at 546.
19791
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however, have viewed and decided the case as presenting a ques-
tion of law arising upon undisputed facts.u
Eighteen months later the North Carolina Supreme Court took up
Murphy.
ANALYSIS
After reviewing the evidence adduced at trial in Murphy, the
supreme court by Chief Justice Sharp, restated the general rule of
termination of executory separation agreements by resumption of
marital relations. As sole authority, the court cited Adamee and
reviewed its holding that resumed cohabitation, irrespective of sex-
ual activity, was a resumption of marital relations as a matter of
law.3
The court then addressed itself to the trial judge's charge, in
particular his statement that "something more than sexual inter-
course alone" is necessary to effectuate a resumption of marital
relations and his instruction that a mutual intent to resume the
marital relationship must be proved by the defendant to avoid the
contract. 3 The court acknowledged that the charge was supported
by two decisions of the court of appeals and the opinion of Professor
Lee on which those decisions were based.37 Likewise, the court recog-
nized that the general rule in most jurisdictions is that "mere casual
acts of sexual intercourse are not conclusive evidence that the par-
ties have ceased to live separate within the meaning of a separation
agreement." However, the court continued, "this rule-be it
'general' or limited-is not the law of North Carolina." The court
held that the law of North Carolina was the rule of State v. Gossett
as stated in the charge of the trial judge:
When a husband and wife enter into a deed of separation the policy
of the law is that they are to live separate, that they are not to keep
up the sexual relation and continue that, but that they are to live
separate and apart and if after the deed of separation is entered
into ac man goes to see his wife and child, and every time he goes
to see her he has sexual intercourse with her, the deed of separation
is of no validity at all . . . and the court instructs you, if you find
that this man visited his wife and child after this deed of separa-
tion was entered into and before this indictment or warrant was
34. Id.
35. 295 N.C. at 394, 245 S.E.2d at 696 (1978).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 395, 245 S.E.2d at 697.
38. Id.
[Vol. 1:131
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taken out ...and that every time he came to see her they had
sexual intercourse, then the court instructs you to disregard en-
tirely the evidence about the deed of separation because, if that
would be true, the parties themselves would disregard it and can-
not expect the court to regard it if they did not regard it, and...
the rights of husband and wife and the duties and obligations
would be reimposed upon the parties."
The Murphy court appears to have read Gossett to hold that
once the acts of sexual intercourse are proved, the separation agree-
ment is void as a matter of law. This is evidenced by the Murphy
court's stated presumption that the wife would move, on remand,
for a summary judgment on the basis of the husband's admissions
during testimony.'0
Citing Young v. Young, the court addressed in passing the
truism that marriage involves "many duties and responsibilities
. . .other than sex,"' but was constrained to hold that "whether
the resumption of sexual relations [is] 'casual', 'isolated' or other-
wise . . .severance of marital relation by separation agreement
and continued sexual intercourse... 'are essentially antagonistic
and irreconcilable notions'.""2
CONCLUSION
The apparent North Carolina rule emerging from Murphy and
Adamee is that when it is proved that an estranged husband and
wife have executed a separation agreement and subsequently en-
gaged in sexual intercourse or resumed cohabitation; the executory
portions of that separation agreement are void as a matter of law.
The Murphy case raises questions as to both its extent and its
conflict with public policy.
The first and most obvious question is whether a single act of
intercourse will void a separation agreement. As noted in another
context, few cases exist involving a single act of sex.'3 However, in
one North Carolina case, an attempt was made to void a separation
agreement on the basis of one night spent in a Charlotte motel room
by estranged spouses." The supreme court upheld the agreement
39.Id. at 396, 245 S.E.2d at 697 (quoting State v. Gossett, 203 N.C. 641, 643-
44, 166 S.E.2d 754, 755 (1932)).
40. 295 N.C. at 398, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
41. Id. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
42. Id. (quoting 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL
CONTRACTS 8-13 (1977)).
43. 1 R. LEE, supra note 22, § 74 at 288, n. 141.
44. Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 90 S.E.2d 547 (1956).
19791
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because the provision in issue was fully executed, but made no
comment on the isolated nature of the sexual contact ameliorating
the force of the general rule. This, coupled with the language of the
Murphy court that the isolated nature of sexual activity is immater-
ial, leads one to believe that a single act would suffice.
Some doubt also might remain regarding the status of the
"intent to reconcile" requirement of the court of appeals in view of
the fact that Murphy did not expressly overrule that court's prior
cases. While it is true that the supreme court did not overrule the
lower court cases in so many words, the flat statement that the rule
requiring a finding of mutual intent was not the law of North Caro-
lina appears too strong to support any doubt.
While surely the public policy of North Carolina is to discour-
age "illicit intercourse and promiscuous assignation,"' 5 an even
more important public policy in North Carolina is to encourage
reconciliation of estranged spouses." Indeed, Justice Exum, a dis-
senter in Murphy, recently spoke for a unanimous court: "[W]e
recognize and adhere, in this state, to a policy which within reason
favors maintenance of the marriage."' 7 The Murphy decision is at
cross purposes with this policy. Estranged spouses, in the wake of
Murphy, now face the prospect of losing the protection and assur-
ance provided by separation agreements when they attempt to de-
termine if full reconciliation is possible, should this attempt involve
sexual contact. This is particularly unfortunate considering the sig-
nificant percentage of marital failure involving sexual problems.' 8
Similarly, the rule announced in Murphy, if strictly applied, is
easily abused. For example, a supporting spouse. who wishes to
rescind a separation agreement could feign, for one night, an at-
tempted reconciliation for the sole purpose of avoiding the contract.
For one night's trust and an honest attempt at mending a ruptured
marriage, the dependent spouse must choose between re-negotiation
or litigation.
The shortcomings of the Murphy rule flow largely from the
Murphy court's disregard of the contractual nature of separaiion
agreements. Though "marriage is not a private affair, involving the
contracting parties alone,"' 9 the court ignored the wisdom of this
statement found in one of the court's cited authorities:
45. State v. Gossett, 203 N.C. 641, 644, 166 S.E. 754, 755 (1932).
46. See 1 R. LEE, supra note 22.
47. Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 180, 240 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1978).
48. See H. LOCKE, PREDICTING ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE 125-57 (3d ed. 1968).
49. Dudley v. Dudley, 225 N.C. 83, 86, 33 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1945).
[Vol. 1:131
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It is frequently said that reconciliation and resumption of the
marital relations will render a contract void. This is a loose and
inaccurate statement of a supposed rule. Courts cannot make or
unmake contracts, but can only determine the effect of express or
implied agreements made by those competent to act for them-
selves. Rescission or abrogation is as volitional as the act of con-
tracting. . . The truth is, and the law is, that having entered into
a valid separation agreement the courts cannot and will not deem
such contract avoided unless the conduct of the parties impels to
the conclusion that they themselves so regarded it."
The above quote, a compromise between the positions of the
court of appeals and the supreme court, is superior to both. Being
in harmony with the objective theory of contracts, it would allow a
court to find, on a case to case basis, the resumption of marital
relations where the conduct of the parties evidences an intent to
permanently reconcile, without the difficulty of proof implicit in the
more subjective approach of the court of appeals. Indeed, one could
argue that State v. Gossett should be read as stating this rule.5 To
adopt a contract-based rule would allow the North Carolina courts
to guard against "illicit intercourse" and at the same time allow
enough flexibility to discourage abuse and remove the disincentive
to renewed contact preparatory to reconciliation. Alternatively,
such a rule could be brought closer to-the Murphy rule by erecting
a rebuttable presumption of resumed marital relations when acts of
sexual intercourse are proved. However stated, a rule which takes
into account both the reasonable expectations of the parties to the
agreement and the demands of public policy is preferable to the
Murphy rule that ignores intentions and expectations.
While the Murphy decision was concerned solely with the effect
of resumed sexual activity on a separation agreement, the rationale
of the case probably will extend to the tolling of the one-year period
of separation required for divorce under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-6.
North Carolina case law, 2 though fragmentary, indicates that this
state follows the general rule obtaining in most jurisdictions that
resumed sexual relations will bar a divorce based on a period of
separation." While this leaves open the question of the effect of
50. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 42, at 8-14.
51. The language of the Judge's charge cited at note 39 supra is to the effect
that sexual intercourse by the parties is conclusive evidence of reconciliation be-
cause an intent to abrogate the agreement is the only conclusion inferable from that
conduct.
52. Mason v. Mason, 226 N.C. 740, 40 S.E.2d 204 (1946); Reynolds v. Rey-
nolds, 210 N.C. 554, 187 S.E. 768 (1936).
53. See 1 R. LEE, supra note 43, § 74 at 288, n. 141.
1979]
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single or isolated acts, strong dicta in Adamee indicates that the
standards for voiding separation agreements and for tolling a period
of separation are identical:
[Tihe heart of a separation agreement is the parties' intention
and agreement to live separate and apart forever, and when a
husband and wife enter into a deed of separation the policy of the
law is that they are to live separate. Therefore, they void the sepa-
ration agreement if they re-establish a matrimonial home.
The same public policy which will not permit spouses to con-
tinue to live together in the same home-holding themselves out
to the public as husband and wife-to sue each other for an abso-
lute divorce on the ground of separation or to base the period of
separation required for a divorce on any time they live together,
will also nullify a separation agreement if the parties resume mari-
tal cohabitation. Whether used in a separation agreement or a
divorce statute, the words "live separate and apart" have the same
meaning."
With obvious approval, the Murphy court cited Adamee as its only
authority for the rule that resumed marital relations voids separa-
tion agreements as a matter of law. The above quoted dictum, when
read together with the implication in Murphy that isolated acts of
sex void a separation agreement, 5 indicates a likelihood that, as a
matter of law, isolated or single acts of sexual intercourse will be
held to toll any period of separation required by the divorce statutes.
In summary, while the edict of Murphy is undoubtedly the law
of North Carolina, the supreme court appears to have made its
decision not so much out of consideration for the changing demands
of public policy or the expectations of the parties or the realities of
modem life as out of the oft-quoted fear that the parties might
"litigate by day and copulate by night.""
Donald R. Teeter
54. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 391, 230 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1976).
55. 295 N.C. at 398, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
56. Holt v. Holt, 77 F.2d 538, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
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